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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
Reporter's Transcript taken on August 6, 2015 will be lodged with the Supreme Court. 
Claimant's Exhibits: 
A. First Report of Injury 
B. Records of the Idaho Industrial Commission 
C. MRis and imaging 2006-2011 
D. Medical records of St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center 
E. Medical records of St. Luke's Clinic 
F. Medical records of Olsen Chiropractic 
G. Medical records of Dr. Jill's Family Chiropractic Center 
H. Medical records Summary 
I. Medical bills 
J. Summary of expenses to date 
K. Tax returns 
L. Medical records of Sirucek Chiropractic Spine & Trauma Center 
Defendants' Exhibits: 
1. Claimant's Responses to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents 
(for impeachment purposes)- WITHDRAWN 
2. Claimant's Responses to Supplemental Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
(for impeachment purposes) - WITHDRAWN 
3. Claimant's Responses to Second Supplemental Interrogatories (for impeachment 
purposes)- WITHDRAWN 
4. Claims information reporting 
5. Medical payment summary 
6. Overall payment summary 
7. Olson Chiropractic records 
8. Imaging 3/11/11 to 7 /11/11 
9. Dr. David McClusky records 
10. Dr. John Hower records 
11. St. Luke's 7 /11/11 records prior to injury 
12. Dr. Doug Stagg - causation/etiology letter 
13. Dr. Michael Hajjar-Independent Medical Examination 
14. Dr, Stagg's concurrence of Dr. Hajjar's IME 
15. St. Luke's records 6/1/11 to 7/13/11 
Additional Documents: 
1. Claimant's Opening Brief filed December 10, 2015 
2. Defendants' Responsive Brief filed December 30, 2015 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LETICIA SALINAS, 
Claimant, 
v. 
BRIDGEVIEW ESTATES, 
Employer, 
and 
IC 2011-014120 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND RECOMMENDATION 
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, F E 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned 
the above-entitled matter to Referee Brian Harper, who conducted a hearing in 
Twin Falls, Idaho, on August 6, 2015. Claimant was represented by Patrick Brown, 
of Twin Falls. Alan Gardner, of Boise, represented Bridgeview Estates ("Employer") 
and Old Republic Insurance Company ("Surety"), Defendants. Oral and documentary 
evidence was admitted. Post-hearing depositions were taken and the parties submitted post-
hearing briefs. The matter came under advisement on January 13, 2016. 
ISSUES 
The issues to be decided are: 
1. Whether the condition for which Claimant seeks benefits was caused by 
the industrial accident; 
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2. Whether Claimant's condition is due m whole or m part to a pre-existing 
and/or subsequent injury/condition; and 
3. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to the following benefits: 
a. Medical care, past and future; 
b. Permanent Partial Impairment (PPI); 
c. Permanent Partial Disability in excess of impairment (PPD); and 
d. Attorney fees. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
On or about May 5, 2011, while in the course and scope of her employment as a 
registered nurse for Employer, Claimant injured her back while conducting 
a patient transfer. Claimant asserts that while she was still treating, Surety informed her 
that the claim was being "temporarily denied" while it investigated Claimant's 
medical background. The temporary denial in effect became permanent when 
Surety stopped communicating with Claimant, and she lacked funds to continue her 
back treatment. 
By April 2013, Claimant had the personal funds to begin treating for her continuing 
back issues. Claimant then hired an attorney, and pursued her previously-denied benefits. 
Claimant argues she is entitled to reimbursement of all medical costs associated 
with her industrial accident incurred after Surety refused to provide further medical 
treatment, as well as future palliative care. She is also entitled to a two percent (2%) 
impairment rating, and permanent disability benefits. Claimant is entitled to attorney fees. 
Defendants argue Claimant has been paid all benefits to which she is entitled. 
She discontinued her medical care after her sprain/strain injury from a work accident, 
and did not resume treatment for over eighteen (18) months. She continued to work during 
this time. Her current condition is not the result of the industrial accident. 
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Claimant has no permanent impairment or disability from the accident. Claimant has failed 
to prove she is entitled to attorney fees. 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in this matter consists of the following: 
1. Claimant's testimony, taken at hearing; 
2. Claimant's Exhibits (CE) A through L, admitted at hearing; 
3. Defendants' Exhibits (DE) 7 through 15, admitted at hearing; 
4. The post-hearing deposition transcript of Anthony Sirucek, D.C., taken on 
September 23, 2015; and 
5. The post-hearing deposition transcript of Michael Hajjar, M.D., taken on 
September 25, 2015. 
Post-Hearing Deposition Objections and Conduct 
Defense counsel lodged forty-five ( 45) objections during the deposition of 
Dr. Sirucek, and fifty-three (53) objections during Dr. Hajjar's deposition cross-
examination. Additionally, defense counsel moved to strike a non-responsive statement of 
Dr. Sirucek at page 93 of his deposition. Defendants' ninety-eight (98) objections 
are overruled; the motion to strike is granted. (Counsel's multiple "asked and answered" 
objections, which may have been sustained at hearing, are overruled on the grounds that 
the legitimate goal of such an objection is to promote the flow of testimony, but by the time 
the objections are read and considered after-the-fact, its legitimate purpose is moot.) 
Claimant's counsel lodged five (5) objections during Dr. Hajjar's deposition. 
He also moved to strike a non-responsive answer from Dr. Hajjar at page 9 
of his deposition. The five (5) objections are overruled; the motion to strike is granted. 
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Due to the behavior of both attorneys, reviewing the deposition transcripts was 
an exercise in frustration, and provides the opportunity to remind all practitioners 
of the standards expected during depositions in the workers' compensation arena. 
To begin with, the "no-holds-barred" mentality which is often a part of 
civil litigation has no place in workers' compensation proceedings. Unlike civil litigation, 
which is truly an adversarial-based process, the goal of workers' compensation - to provide 
an injured employee with those statutory benefits to which the worker is entitled - should 
be shared by all parties. While honest differences of opinion may well exist when seeking 
to determine benefit entitlement, attempting to gain an advantage through gamesmanship, 
hyper-technical application of the procedural rules, subterfuge, harassment in any form, 
production delay, and similar tactics, will not be tolerated. 
Post-hearing depositions are a part of the hearing process, and should be conducted 
with the same professionalism as would be expected if the interrogation was taking place 
at hearing. Incessant interrupting with objections, speaking objections, and comments 
seemingly geared toward disrupting the flow of testimony would not be tolerated at hearing 
and are likewise inappropriate during depositions. Counsel arguing with each other, 
making snide comments, telling anyone to "shut up," or making belittling remarks, 
is unprofessional and incredibly rude. The deponent, as well as the opposing attorney, 
deserves more respect than to be subjected to this type of conduct. It is also beyond debate 
that intimidating behavior, such as standing over a deponent or opposing counsel, yelling 
and gesturing, or stomping about the room is also impermissible. Repeating the same 
question ad nauseam, and disparaging or arguing with a witness is also not tolerable. 
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JRP 16 is broad enough to sanction such abusive conduct. Additionally, 
Idaho Code§ 72-715 addresses misbehavior and obstruction of the hearing process, 
and provides penalties therefore. Attorneys might consider asking for a brief recess 
to regain their composure when they feel their professionalism slipping. No one 
should risk sanctions because they let themselves get carried away with the moment. 
Having considered the evidence and briefing of the parties, the Referee submits 
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law for review by the Commission. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Accident and Post-Accident Medical Care 
1. On or about May 5, 2011, Claimant, a registered nurse working for Employer 
in Twin Falls, injured her low back during a patient transfer while in the course and scope 
of her employment. 
2. Defendants directed Claimant to Douglas Stagg, M.D., at St. Luke's Clinic -
Occupational Medicine in Twin Falls. 
3. At her initial visit on June 1, 2011, Claimant complained of diffuse low back 
pain with intermittent radicular pain into the right groin area. She claimed no prior 
back problems. 
4. Dr. Stagg diagnosed low back strain and imposed temporary restrictions of 
no lifting, pushing or pulling greater than ten (10) pounds, and no transfers. 
These restrictions were to remain in place until Claimant's next appointment on June 6. 
Dr. Stagg prescribed stretching exercises, walking, ice and heat to the low back, 
together with ibuprofen. 
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5. On her June 6, 2011 visit, Claimant's right-sided radicular discomfort 
had subsided, but she had developed a similar pain into the left groin and hip area. 
Her movements, such as gait and flexion, were improving. Dr. Stagg reduced her 
ibuprofen regimen, and left her work restrictions intact until her next scheduled visit 
of June 9, 2011. 
6. On June 9, 2011, Claimant reported very little discomfort in her low back, 
but still had occasional radicular-type paresthesias and pain into her left groin. Dr. Stagg 
prescribed five (5) physical therapy treatment sessions and left her restrictions in place 
until his next scheduled appointment on June 21, 2011. On the June 9 visit, Dr. Stagg 
noted Claimant had been seen by fellow physician David McClusky, M.D., on June 7 for 
emotional and sleep issues unrelated to the industrial accident. In response, Dr. McClusky 
took Claimant off work for two (2) weeks. 
7. When Claimant returned on June 21, 2011 with no improvement in her 
symptoms in spite of not working for the preceding two (2) weeks, Dr. Stagg requested 
and obtained authorization for an MRI of the lumbosacral spine. He also reiterated 
Claimant begin physical therapy, which she then had yet to start. He kept Claimant's 
temporary restrictions in place. 
8. At her July 6, 2011 doctor's appointment, Claimant continued to complain 
of mild, intermittent pain in her left groin, mainly while sitting. She also complained of 
new-onset left parascapular discomfort. During this time frame she was also treating 
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with another physician for right Achilles tendonitis, and wearing a walking boot. 1 She still 
had not begun physical therapy. 
for July 11, 2011. 
Claimant's low back MRI was scheduled 
9. Claimant's July 11, 2011 MRI showed mild degenerative disc disease 
and facet arthropathy in the lumbar spine, but no evidence of acute traumatic changes, 
spinal stenosis, or neural foraminal narrowing. 
10. Dr. Stagg next saw Claimant on July 13, 2011. Her complaints were similar 
to previous visits, although subjectively she complained of a bit more pain. She had 
missed her first physical therapy appointment, so it was rescheduled for July 18. Dr. Stagg 
noted the MRI showed nothing acute. His notes contain no reference to any ongoing 
upper back complaints. He scheduled a follow up visit for July 20, and kept Claimant's 
temporary restrictions unchanged until then. Claimant did not return to Dr. Stagg after this 
July 13 visit, as discussed below. 
11. Claimant attended her initial physical therapy sess10n on July 18, 2011. 
She was scheduled to return for treatment on July 21, 2011, but did not keep that 
appointment. The physical therapy records reflect that this appointment was cancelled by 
Claimant. (Claimant's Exhibit D, 164.) 
12. Claimant saw Dr. McClusky m April and July 2012 for specific issues 
unrelated to this claim. Claimant's medical record from her July visit noted that she denied 
any pain at that time. Claimant did not mention any low back issues. 
1 At her first physical therapy session, the therapist questioned if some of Claimant's ongoing low back complaints 
could stem from her wearing the walking boot, which Claimant wore until five (5) days before starting 
physical therapy. 
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13. In April 2013, Claimant treated twice with Joshua Olsen, D.C., for low back 
symptoms she attributed, on her case history update form, to the 2011 industrial accident. 
However, she told Dr. Olsen her mid and low back discomfort had been present for the past 
few weeks, getting unbearable in the past week. 
14. On June 20, 2013, Claimant sought treatment with Twin Falls chiropractor 
Jill Adepoju, D.C., known locally and referred to by counsel, and herein, as "Dr. Jill". 
Claimant wrote on her intake form that she was not sure if her current complaints were 
due to transferring a patient at work in 2010. Dr. Jill's typed notes of that date indicate 
that Claimant reported hurting her back at work in 2010 and had back pain since then.2 
Claimant's pain had been ongoing for a week at the time of this visit. Sitting or lying 
too long aggravated Claimant's pain; walking and moving lessened it. 
15. Claimant next saw Dr. Jill on August 28, 2013. Claimant rated her pain 
at 7/10, and noticeable 75% of the time. Her pain was worse in the afternoon and 
aggravated by lifting, pulling, pushing, carrying, working, changing positions, sitting, 
and bending. Rest, ice, heat, chiropractic, massage, and Tylenol reduced her discomfort. 
Dr. Jill found subluxations, spasms, and inflammation in Claimant's cervical, thoracic, 
lumbar, sacral, sacroiliac, left pelvic, left buttock, left posterior leg, and left posterior knee. 
Dr. Jill diagnosed spinal segmental dysfunction and encouraged Claimant to continue with 
the suggested treatment plan, which included more regular and frequent visits to Dr. Jill. 
Claimant expressed doubts if she could afford that level of treatment. 
2 While the records reference "2010", it is assumed Claimant was referring to her industrial accident of 2011. 
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16. Claimant saw Dr. Jill agam on December 23 and 27, 2013. 
By the December 27 visit, Dr. Jill noted Claimant was in a lot of pain, and it was starting to 
get to Claimant because it seemed like the pain was never going away. 
17. On Claimant's January 20, 2014 visit with Dr. Jill, Claimant complained of 
pam from her low back into her left leg. Dr. Jill adjusted the ever-present 
multiple subluxations and noted the never-changing inflammation throughout 
Claimant's spine.3 Dr. Jill stressed the importance of treating two or three (2 or 3) times 
per week to reduce Claimant's back pain. 
18. Claimant also saw Dr. McClusky for a wellness check in January 2014, 
at which time she complained of some neck pain from lifting, and continuing low back pain 
from her 2011 industrial accident. Dr. McClusky was more concerned with Claimant's 
liver enzymes than any other finding that day. He did not suggest any follow up care 
for Claimant's neck and low back complaints. 
19. Claimant did not return to Dr. Jill until November 17, 2014. Thereafter, she 
treated with Dr. Jill on November 26 and December 1, 2014. Her complaints and Dr. Jill's 
findings were unchanged through this time frame. 
20. Dr. Jill wrote a report to Claimant's attorney on March 8, 2015, in which 
she outlined her findings, proposed management plan, diagnosis, and prognosis. It was 
Dr. Jill's opinion that Claimant's 2011 industrial accident resulted in lumbar facet 
syndrome. She opined that without frequent chiropractic, electrical muscle stimulation, 
and intersegmental traction treatments, Claimant's condition would continue to deteriorate, 
3 It appears portions of Dr. Jill's notes may be "canned" in that they are identical from visit to visit. If they are not, 
it is interesting that the treatments made no progress in relieving Claimant's continued acute symptoms such as hot, 
inflamed muscles throughout the length of her spine. 
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but with such treatments there was a "fair" chance Claimant could obtain some long term 
pain relief. 
21. Thereafter, Claimant treated on eleven (11) occasions between March 20 and 
July 7, 2015. Claimant's subjective improvement began almost immediately after 
Dr. Jill's report. On just her second post-report visit, March 30, 2015, Claimant's pain 
had gone from 7 /10 and noticeable 90% of the time when she last treated in 
December 2014, to 5/10 and noticeable 70% of the time. When Claimant came in the 
next day, March 31, her pain was only noticeable 65% of the time. Dr. Jill's 
objective findings had not changed from previous treatments; the inflammation 
throughout Claimant's spine was still noted, as were the multiple subluxations. 
22. By her April 1, 2015 treatment, Claimant's subjective pain was at 4.5/10. 
She apparently did not treat for the next four (4) weeks, and when Claimant next treated 
on April 28, her pain was back to 7 /10, noticeable 90% of the time. For the remainder of 
her treatment regimen with Dr. Jill, Claimant's pain continued to hover between 5 and 
6/10, often depending on the number of days between doctor visits. Dr. Jill's 
findings stayed constant. 
Relevant Pre-Accident Low Back Issues and Care 
23. Claimant treated sporadically with David Long, D.C. in Twin Falls since 
October 2006. While her initial complaints consisted of cervical and thoracic pain, by 
December 2006 Claimant was also treating with Dr. Long for pain in her low back 
which Claimant described as severe enough to make daily activities difficult. 
24. Claimant sought treatment after she injured her lumbar and lumbo-sacral area 
in a work-related accident while attempting to pick a patient up from the floor in January 2007. 
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25. In December 2010, Claimant again treated with Dr. Long for pain 
and decreased motion in her lumbopelvic area. She described her pain as being so intense that 
it caused her difficulty in standing, sitting, and functioning throughout her day. 
/ME Expert Witness Testimony 
Dr. Sirucek 
26. Anthony Sirucek, D.C., a Twin Falls chiropractor and Dr. Jill's father, 
was hired on Claimant's behalf to perform an IME and prepare a causation report. 
As part of that assignment, he reviewed medical records and examined Claimant 
prior to June 29, 2015, the date of his report. 
27. Dr. Sirucek concluded that Claimant's 2011 industrial accident was directly 
and causally related to her current complaints, and further opined that: 
• Claimant's injury was permanent; 
• Claimant's injury was responsible for her referred pain 
into her lower extremity; 
• Claimant's injury was magnified by her pre-existing 
"risk factors" of arthritic degenerative disc and lumbar 
facet joints; 
• Claimant's injury was medically stable by the time of 
Dr. Sirucek's examination; 
• Claimant's pain management (palliative) care by Dr. Jill 
was reasonable and necessary as a result of Claimant's 
industrial accident in question; 
• Claimant would require regular palliative care into 
the future for her industrial injury; 
• Claimant's injury has limited her socially and m 
her employment; 
• Claimant's injury resulted in a two percent (2%) whole-
person permanent impairment. 
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Dr. HaUar 
28. In or around May 2015, Michael Hajjar, M.D., a neurosurgeon from Boise, 
was hired by Defendants to examine Claimant, review medical records, and prepare 
an IME report. 
29. Dr. Hajjar determined that Claimant's 2011 industrial injury, which he felt 
was correctly diagnosed as a lumbar strain, had completely run its course 
within six (6) months of the injury. Claimant would have reached MMI by 
November 2011. Her injury resulted in no permanent impairment. 
30. Dr. Hajjar opined that Claimant's current back complaints stem from 2013, 
as evidenced by medical records. Claimant's ongoing treatment with Dr. Jill focusing on 
overall wellness was appropriate, but unrelated to the workers' compensation injury. 
Claimant should avoid heavy lifting, twisting, stooping, prolonged standing, exposure 
to vibrations, and participating in difficult patient lifts, due to her pre-existing back issues 
of spondylosis and facet arthropathy, unrelated to her industrial accident in question. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
31. Claimant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
all facts essential to recovery on her claims. Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 849 
P.2d 934, (1993). Proof of a possible causal link is not sufficient to satisfy this burden. 
Beardsley v. Idaho Forest Industries, 127 Idaho 404,406,901 P.2d 511, 513 (1995). 
Causation 
32. The threshold issue is whether Claimant's current low back symptoms 
are causally related to her industrial accident of May 5, 2011. Related to that issue is whether 
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Claimant's low back complaints are due in whole or in part to pre-existing or subsequent 
injuries or conditions. These two issues will be discussed concurrently. 
Credibility 
33. When analyzing the competing arguments, Claimant's credibility, and ability to 
accurately recall information and events, is critical. Credibility is bifurcated into two categories, 
"observational credibility" and "substantive credibility". As noted in Painter v. Potlatch Corp., 
138 Idaho 309, 63 P.3d 435 (2003), "observational credibility" goes to the demeanor 
of the claimant on the witness stand, while "substantive credibility" may be judged on 
the grounds of numerous . . maccurac1es or conflicting facts and does not require 
personal observation at the hearing. 
34. On several occasions at hearing, Claimant's direct examination was 
dramatically different than what was established on cross examination. For example, 
Claimant testified she had no prior low back treatment or problems. She testified she had not 
seen a chiropractor for any back problem. She modified that to say she went once for her 
upper back when she was pregnant. She thought it was for her rib cage. On cross examination, 
she allowed that maybe she went to Dr. Olsen once - perhaps for a massage. When the doctor's 
records were read to her, she changed her response to indicate that she went to Dr. Olsen only for 
upper back issues. When pressed further, she acknowledged the accuracy of his records 
showing that he also treated her for low back pain. The same basic scenario unfolded 
concerning Claimant's treatment with Dr. Long, who also treated Claimant for low back issues 
several times over the years, including just months before the subject accident. Claimant also 
exaggerated other testimony, as noted in Defendants' briefing. 
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35. Claimant did not appear to be scheming to deceive with her testimony. Part of 
the issue is the fact she is a poor historian. Part of the issue appears to be that Claimant seemed 
willing to say whatever sounded good and assisted her case, not necessarily with a contriving 
intent but rather with an almost casual indifference toward accuracy. Perhaps her nerves made it 
difficult to focus and affected her responses. Also, it is not beyond consideration that over time 
her memory of events may have modified to place more emphasis on her industrial accident 
as being the root of all her medical and emotional problems. Perhaps the tendency 
toward exaggeration is simply part of her personality. While she came across as likeable, 
hard working, and basically honest at hearing, her testimony, blatantly inconsistent with 
the medical records, coupled with her poor memory for time frames and details, diminishes 
the weight of her contested testimony when not corroborated. 
Medical Benefits Suspension 
36. Claimant's initial post-injury history is undisputed. However, controversy arises 
about the time she began physical therapy. Claimant asserts Surety prevented her from further 
medical or therapy care by "temporarily" suspending her benefits pending review of her 
past medical history. Claimant asserted Surety sent her a letter on this subject. Dr. Sirucek 
claimed to have seen it; he even cited the date it was prepared - August 3, 2011. Yet the letter 
is not in the record. Likewise, none of Surety's adjusting notes are in the record. 
No Industrial Commission records, including any specifically noting a change of status for this 
temporary suspension of benefits, are in the record. 
37. Claimant's version of events is that after she was "cut off' from further workers' 
compensation coverage she was informed by Dr. Stagg' s office staff that she could not receive 
additional treatment without first making arrangements for payment. She then persisted 
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through numerous attempts to talk with Surety's adjuster, and finally made contact with a 
gentleman named Chris. He told Claimant the Surety needed a medical release, which she 
promptly executed and sent back by September 2011. Thereafter, she was unable to get anyone 
from Surety to return her calls. In October or November she gave up trying to speak 
with Surety. By then, Claimant was no longer working for Employer, and had no money to 
obtain care for her low back. She was also putting her husband through school at that time, 
further straining her finances. 
38. Defendants counter by noting neither Dr. Stagg's nor the physical therapist's 
records make note of any insurance issues. Rather they simply state that Claimant was 
a "no show" for appointments. Also, Claimant had the money to see other doctors 
during this time for issues unrelated to her low back, including Drs. McClusky and Howar. 
Claimant testified to seeing an O.B. P.A. for issues as well. 
39. In correspondence from Dr. Stagg to Surety dated November 16, 2011, 
the doctor noted that when he last saw Claimant on July 13, 2011, she was starting a new job 
at St. Luke's Home Health. (Actually, Claimant's new job was at Idaho Home Health, 
where she worked for less than three (3) months. Thereafter she was unemployed and receiving 
unemployment benefits until February 2012, when she took a position at St. Luke's 
Home Health where she worked until July 2012. She left St. Luke's Home Health due to 
the lack of hours she was provided.) 
40. Records from the physical therapy office indicate Claimant was scheduled 
for additional sessions but she cancelled them and did not reschedule. Defendants point out 
this would correlate with Claimant's testimony that the therapy was "ridiculous" since it 
focused on flexibility exercises which did not address her back problem. 
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41. While Dr. Stagg's records do not include a notation that Surety was suspending 
coverage, that fact is not dispositive. It could well be as Claimant testified, that the doctor's 
front desk personnel notified Claimant she would need to arrange for payment if she wanted 
an appointment. This discussion might not have made its way to Dr. Stagg, so that he had 
no idea why Claimant did not show up for her scheduled appointment. He acknowledged 
Claimant was still having low back pain when he last saw her. There is little reason 
why Claimant would "no show" her appointment with him absent some 
intervening circumstance. Coverage denial with no way to pay for the appointment is a 
strong intervening circumstance. 
42. Regarding physical therapy, Claimant testified she was told to come back 
as needed, and she felt the therapy exercises were not useful for her back problems. She also 
knew she had no workers' compensation coverage at that time. It was reasonable for her to not 
go back to physical therapy in light of her understanding. 
43. Defendants presented no evidence to rebut Claimant's assertion that Surety 
suspended her medical benefits other than the lack of such notation in the contemporaneous 
medical records. 
44. It is very cunous why Claimant did not produce the August 3, 2011 letter 
from Surety. However, the evidence on the whole, including Dr. Sirucek's notation that he 
saw the letter coupled with Claimant's testimony, supports the proposition that Claimant 
was cut off from workers' compensation medical benefits in late July/early August 2011. 
Expert Opinions 
45. Simply because Claimant's medical care was suspended in 2011 does not prove 
she was still having low back pain associated with her industrial accident in 2013 when 
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she resumed treatment. It does cut against the notion that Claimant did not return to Dr. Stagg 
and physical therapy because her injury had resolved and she was no longer symptomatic 
by August 2011. 
46. Dr. Hajjar based his opinion on several factors, including Claimant's history with 
her medical providers. Had his opinion simply rested on the fact of her "no shows", it would 
carry little weight in light of the fact Claimant's abrupt cessation of treatment was due 
in large part to Surety's behavior. However, Dr. Hajjar also noted that the type of injury 
Claimant sustained typically heals within six (6) months, and by November 2011 should have 
resolved with no lasting impairment. He based his opinion on the MRI and medical records, 
and his experience in the practice of helping people with back pain. 
47. Dr. Sirucek, who also helps people with back pam, highly disputed 
Dr. Hajjar's opinion. Dr. Sirucek opined that Claimant suffered a permanent industrial injury 
in May 2011 which remained symptomatic as of the time of hearing. There is little to support 
that opinion other than Claimant's testimony. While Claimant argues her "unrebutted" 
testimony must be taken at face value unless inherently improbable, the Referee need not 
determine if her testimony is improbable since it is not ttuly unrebutted. 
48. Rebuttal may come not just from testimony of a competing witness but also from 
other evidence such as contrasting medical records, as in this case. It may also come from 
the Claimant herself by proving her testimony unreliable through impeachment from 
the witness stand. Once the Claimant has shown her testimony is untrustworthy, the Referee 
is not bound to accept it even if no competing witness testimony stands against it. 
See e.g., Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 447-48, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937). 
(The rule applicable to all witnesses is that a court must accept as true the positive, 
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uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless the testimony is inherently improbable, 
or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing; the court may not 
arbitrarily disregard the testimony of a witness unimpeached by any of the modes known 
to the law, if such testimony does not exceed probability.) (Emphasis added.) 
49. In the present case, Dr. Hajjar's opinion is given more weight than those 
of Dr. Sirucek and Dr. Jill for reasons explained below. 
50. First, either Dr. Sirucek was not shown or chose not to consider Claimant's 
full history of low back complaints when forming his opinion. Since he ascribes to the theory 
that strains and sprains are permanent injuries, he should have explained why Claimant's 
previous low back injuries could not have been responsible for her current condition. 
More importantly, by ignoring or being in the dark about Claimant's true history of 
low back complaints, Dr. Sirucek's opinion is based on incomplete information which could 
skew his outcome. The same defect afflicts Dr. Jill's opinions on causation. 
While it is understandable that when a patient presents with pain which she links to a past event, 
the physician may rely on that history to form an opinion on causation; if the information 
is inaccurate, then the causation opinion may also be inaccurate. 
51. The fact that Dr. Sirucek is Dr. Jill's father does not help his appearance 
of impartiality. He testified he got involved to help out his daughter. His testimony that 
Claimant should continue to treat with Dr. Jill for the indefinite future based upon Claimant's 
need for palliative relief of a permanent injury certainly does help his daughter, assuming she 
is paid for her continuing services. One way to ensure payment is to causally link the need 
for such treatment to a workers' compensation claim, and not to Claimant's pre-existing 
back issues. 
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52. Claimant is critical of Dr. Hajjar's opm10n that Claimant was at MMI 
by November 2011 due to the fact Dr. Stagg's last medical record in August showed she 
was still symptomatic. Claimant argues it is pure speculation for the doctor to rate her at MMI 
by November. In reality, all experts, when expressing an opinion, rely to some extent on 
"educated speculation". After all, an opinion is simply a belief formed from the application 
of known facts coupled with knowledge on the subject. If sprains typically resolve in 
six (6) months or less, it is more than just speculation for Dr. Hajjar to opine that 
Claimant's sprain will resolve in six (6) months, where the MRI showed no acute injury 
and the medical records show mild symptoms. This is not to say no sprain can remain 
symptomatic beyond six ( 6) months, but in this case the weight of the evidence 
suggests it did not. 
53. Claimant did not treat or even mention to a physician any complaints of back pain 
from Juiy 2011 until April 19, 2013 when she was seen by Chiropractor Olsen. On the occasion 
of that visit, Dr. Olsen recorded the following history from Claimant: 
Subjective: 
Letty says that she has been having some discomfort in her mid back and low 
back for the past few weeks. In the past week the pain has been getting worse and 
becoming more unbearable. Letty says that the discomfort has been keeping her 
from being able to work. She has had some trouble with her lower back in the 
past and responded well to chiropractic care. She has also been having pain 
traveling down the back of her left leg to her knee. 
Claimant's Exhibit F, 239. 
This note does not lend support to Claimant's current insistence that her low back complaints 
between July 2011 and April 2013 were unrelenting. Given the fact Claimant had periodic low 
back issues pre-dating 2011 for which she sought treatment and that she treated for other 
medical issues between 2011 and 2013, it is more likely than not that Claimant did not continue 
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to suffer low back pain related to the 2011 injury through the time of hearing. If anything, 
the record supports the notion that Claimant suffers from periodic low back pain and has since 
at least 2006. 
54. When considering the record as a whole, Claimant has failed to prove her current 
low back condition is causally related to her workplace accident of May 5, 2011. 
Remaining Issues 
55. Claimant seeks benefits for medical care, PPI, PPD, and attorney fees. 
These issues are discussed in tum. 
Medical Care 
56. Claimant has not shown she obtained any medical care for her low back 
during the time immediately after Surety discontinued her claim, to wit, during the last part 
of 2011 or into the first part of 2012. Her first low back-related treatment came in April 2013. 
Claimant did not prove this or subsequent treatment was causally related to her May 2011 
work injury. 
57. Claimant has not proven the right to past unpaid medical care or future 
medical care, palliative or curative, related to her May 5, 2011 industrial accident. 
PP! 
58. Permanent impairment is any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss 
after maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved and a claimant's position is considered 
medically stable. Henderson v. McCain Foods, 142 Idaho 559, 567, 130 P.3d 1097, 1105 
(2006). Idaho Code § 72-424 provides that the evaluation of permanent impairment is a 
medical appraisal of the nature and extent of the injury or disease as it affects an injured 
employee's personal efficiency in the activities of daily living, such as self-care, 
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communication, normal living postures, ambulation, elevation, traveling, and other activities. 
The Commission can accept or reject the opinion of a physician regarding impairment. 
Clarkv. City of Lewiston, 133 Idaho 723, 992 P.2d 172 (1999). "When deciding the weight 
to be given an expert opinion, the Commission can certainly consider whether the expert's 
reasoning and methodology has been sufficiently disclosed and whether or not the opinion 
takes into consideration all relevant facts." Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Industries, 
136 Idaho 733, 40 P.3d 91 (2002). The Commission is the ultimate evaluator of impairment. 
Urry v. Walker & Fox Masonry, 115 Idaho 750, 769 P.2d 1122 (1989). 
59. Dr. Sirucek is the only doctor in this case to assign an impairment rating. 
Dr. Sirucek opined that Claimant suffered a two (2%) percent whole person impairment 
from her industrial accident in question. His rating was based on flawed assumptions, 
as discussed previously, and thus his rating is afforded no weight. 
60. Dr. Sirucek testified that Claimant's industrial mJury was magnified by 
her pre-existing arthritic degenerative disc and lumbar facet joints. He also testified that 
once injured, Claimant was more susceptible to future injury at that site. Dr. Hajjar 
testified that Claimant should avoid patient transfers and heavy lifting, not due to her 2011 
back strain but rather due to her pre-existing conditions. 
61. Claimant testified she sought jobs in the nursing field that did not require 
patient transfers after her 2011 work injury. All doctors and Claimant herself recognize 
that she should not seek employment where patient transfers or other heavy lifting 
are required. However, the issue is not whether Claimant is functionally limited, 
but whether those limitations are due to her 2011 industrial injury. While her injury 
may have been magnified by her pre-existing condition, there is no evidence 
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Claimant suffered a permanent injury in 2011 or that her current and future limitations 
are due to that accident. 
62. When considering the record as a whole, Claimant has failed to prove she 
suffered a permanent impairment as a result of her May 5, 2011 industrial accident, and 
thus is not entitled to PPI benefits. 
63. By definition, without impairment there is no disability. Idaho Code § 72-
102(11). Since Claimant did not suffer a permanent impairment, she can not have suffered 
permanent disability. Claimant has failed to prove she is entitled to PPD benefits. 
Attorney Fees 
64. Claimant asserts entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804, 
which provides: 
If the commission or any court before whom any proceedings are 
brought under this law determines that the employer or his surety 
contested a claim for compensation made by an injured employee or 
dependent of a deceased employee without reasonable ground, or 
that an employer or his surety neglected or refused within a 
reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to 
pay to the injured employee or his dependents the compensation 
provided by law, or without reasonable grounds discontinued 
payment of compensation as provided by law justly due and owing 
to the employee or his dependents, the employer shall pay reasonable 
attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by this law. 
In all such cases the fees of attorneys employed by injured 
employees or their dependents shall be fixed by the commission. 
The decision that grounds exist for awarding a claimant attorney fees is a factual determination 
which rests with the Commission. Troutner v. Traffic Control Company, 97 Idaho 525, 528, 
547 P.2d 1130, 1133 (1976). 
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65. Under Idaho Code§ 72-804, there are three (3) ways in which a surety may incur 
attorney fees. First, it may unreasonably contest a claim for benefits; that did not happen here. 
Second, a surety may fail to pay benefits within a reasonable time after receipt of a written claim 
for compensation; that did not happen here. Third, a surety may discontinue compensation 
justly due and owing an employee without a reasonable ground; this prong of Idaho Code § 72-
804 warrants closer scrutiny. 
66. Claimant testified convincingly that while she was still symptomatic and 
actively treating medically and with physical therapy, Surety "temporarily" discontinued 
her medical benefits after accepting her claim. Since sureties are encouraged to obtain 
prompt treatment for an injured employee, the practice of providing such prompt medical care 
first and then beginning the investigation on causation and other such issues is lauded. 
Sometimes the investigation leads a surety to change course and deny further coverage 
as additional facts come to light. That too is permissible in appropriate cases. 
67. Here, Surety initially provided Claimant adequate medical care, including an MRI 
and a referral to physical therapy, on an accepted industrial accident. Surety then decided to 
conduct a more thorough investigation into Claimant's medical past and asked for a signed 
medical release to help facilitate such investigation. Claimant provided the requested document. 
68. Surety discontinued providing medical treatment on a "temporary" basis 
while they gathered Claimant's medical records. Claimant was notified orally and by letter 
of this fact. Claimant was also informed by her treating physician's staff that she would need to 
arrange for payment of the doctor's charges while her workers' compensation coverage 
was in abeyance. She testified she could not afford this option. 
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69. Claimant further testified that after providing the medical release she attempted 
on numerous occasions for the next month or longer to speak with Surety's adjuster 
on her claim. She left voice messages but Surety never contacted Claimant back, orally 
or in writing. 
70. Surety owed a duty to Claimant to communicate promptly and keep her informed 
of the status of her claim in circumstances such as presented herein. Surety also had 
the obligation to investigate her claim promptly and efficiently. In a case such as this one, 
where Claimant is actively treating for a symptomatic accepted condition and not at MMI, 
Surety's responsibility included addressing any coverage concerns as promptly as 
was reasonable and communicating its findings to Claimant without delay. 
71. Surety's actions in leaving Claimant in the dark as to whether or not she had 
continuing medical coverage at a time when she should have been receiving medical care, 
and in fact had appointments scheduled, was not reasonable. In effect, Surety 
discontinued compensation justly due and owing to Claimant without a reasonable ground, 
not per se by temporarily suspending her medical coverage, but by unreasonably delaying 
its decision on continuing coverage on an accepted claim and/or refusing to communicate with 
Claimant on her coverage status despite her repeated attempts to speak with the adjuster. 
72. Surety's actions led to the uncertainty that helped fuel this litigation. 
By discontinuing care before a physician declared Claimant at MMI, Surety left the door open 
for Claimant to more forcefully argue that she never did achieve medical stability after 
the industrial accident. It is nearly axiomatic that the greater the uncertainty, 
i.e. unresolved issues, the greater the chance for contested litigation. After all, 
cases with a certain outcome rarely end up going to hearing. 
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73. In the present case, had Claimant been allowed to treat to MMI, her argument 
that she never reached MMI would be less of an open question. While there is no guarantee 
that Claimant would not contest her treater's opinion regarding medical stability, 
without that opinion Claimant had only an after-the-fact IME doctor's opinion to overcome. 
While she did not overcome that opinion, Surety's conduct invited this litigation 
by unreasonably leaving Claimant in a legal and medical limbo. 
74. The fact that Claimant did not prevail on her causation claim does not prove 
Surety acted reasonably. Idaho Code § 72-804 does not speak in terms of a prevailing party. 
To obtain attorney fees under the statute, Claimant need only prove one of the three (3) 
prohibited behaviors. For an award of attorney fees in this case, Claimant must, and did, prove 
(1) an industrial injury, (2) causally-related treatment (prior to November 2011) for such injury, 
and (3) Surety discontinuing such causally-related treatment without reasonable grounds. 
Claimant has satisfied her obligation for an award of attorney fees in pursuing this litigation. 
75. Unless the parties can agree on an amount for reasonable attorney fees, 
Claimant's counsel shall, within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of 
the Commission's decision, file with the Commission a memorandum of attorney fees 
incurred in counsel's representation of Claimant in connection with these benefits, 
and an affidavit m support thereof with appropriate elaboration on 
Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984). 
The memorandum shall be submitted for the purpose of assisting the Commission 
in discharging its responsibility to determine reasonable attorney fees in this matter. 
Within fourteen (14) days of the filing of the memorandum and affidavit thereof, 
Defendants may file a memorandum in response to Claimant's memorandum. 
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If Defendants object to the time expended or the hourly charge claimed, or any other 
representation made by Claimant's counsel, the objection must be set forth 
with particularity. Within seven (7) days after Defendants' counsel files the above-
referenced memorandum, Claimant's counsel may file a reply memorandum. 
The Commission, upon receipt of the foregoing pleadings, will review the matter 
and issue an order determining attorney fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Claimant has failed to prove her current low back condition was caused 
in whole or in part by the industrial accident of May 5, 2011. 
2. Claimant has failed to prove her right to reimbursement for medical care 
for her low back after she reached MMI in November 2011. 
3. Claimant has failed to prove she is entitled permanent partial impairment (PPI) 
benefits from her industrial injury. 
4. Claimant has failed to prove she is entitled to permanent partial disability (PPD) 
benefits from her industrial injury. 
5. Claimant has proven she is entitled to an award of attorney fees under 
Idaho Code § 72-804 for Surety's prolonged discontinuation of medical benefits 
without a reasonable ground. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
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RECOMMENDATION 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
the Referee recommends that the Commission adopt such findings and conclusions 
as its own and issue an appropriate final order. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Brian Harper,' Re~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the l(th day of (/1C1Jlt11 , 2016, a true and correct copy 
ofthe foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
RECOMMENDATION was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
PATRICK BROWN 
PO BOX 125 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
ALAN GARDNER 
POBOX2528 
BOISE ID 83701 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 27 
27 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LETICIA SALINAS, 
Claimant, 
V. 
BRJDGEVIEW ESTATES, 
Employer, 
and 
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC 2011-014120 
ORDER 
F E 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-717, Referee Brian Harper submitted the record 
in the above-entitled matter, together with his recommended findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, to the members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review. 
Each of the undersigned Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendation 
of the Referee. The Commission concurs with this recommendation. Therefore, the Commission 
approves, confirms, and adopts the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
as its own. 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Claimant has failed to prove her current low back condition was caused 
in whole or in part by the industrial accident of May 5, 2011. 
2. Claimant has failed to prove her right to reimbursement for medical care 
for her low back after she reached MMI in November 2011. 
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3. Claimant has failed to prove she is entitled permanent partial impairment (PPI) 
benefits from her industrial injury. 
4. Claimant has failed to prove she is entitled to permanent partial disability (PPD) 
benefits from her industrial injury. 
5. Claimant has proven she is entitled to an award of attorney fees under 
Idaho Code § 72-804 for Surety's prolonged discontinuation of medical benefits 
without a reasonable ground. 
6. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive 
as to all matters adjudicated. 
DATED this~ day of Vl(lqatia , 2016. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Participated but did not sign 
R.D. Maynard, Chairman 
' 
ORDER-2 
29 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of fYtM 2016, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
PATRICK BROWN 
PO BOX 125 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
jsk 
ORDER-3 
ALAN GARDNER 
PO BOX2528 
BOISE ID 83701 
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ALAN R. GARDNER (ISB No. 2342) 
MICHAEL G. MCPEEK (ISB No. 2436) 
MARGIE R. CLEVERDON (ISB No. 9755) 
I I 
GARDNER LAW OFFICE Zfilh MAR 214 P 4: J8 
1410 W. Washington - 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
RECEIVED 
INOUSTHIAL COMMISSION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LETICIA SALINAS, 
Claimant, 
V. 
BRIDGEVIEW ESTATES, 
Employer, 
and 
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE CO., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I.C. Case No. 2011-014120 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
COME NOW the above-named Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718 and Rule 3 G of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure 
Under the Workers' Compensation Law and move the Commission for reconsideration of the 
Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order filed March 4, 2016, to the 
extent such findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order pertain to an award of attorney fees to 
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Claimant. This motion is based on the grounds set out in the accompanying Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this ~day of March, 2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEE.EBY CERTIFY that on the 2,Y.."'4-- day of March, 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Patrick D. Brown 
516 Hansen Street East 
P.O. Box 125 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
Legal Assistant 
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ALAN R. GARDNER (ISB No. 2342) 
MICHAEL G. MCPEEK (ISB No. 2436) 
MARGIE R. CLEVERDON (ISB No. 9755) 
GARDNER LAW OFFICE ZUlb M.~R 21.1 P ti: 18 RIG/ 
1410 W. Washington - 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
RECEIVED 
!NOUS TRIAL COHHISSION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LETICIA SALINAS, 
Claimant, 
V. 
BRIDGEVIEW ESTATES, 
Employer, 
and 
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE CO., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I.C. Case No. 2011-014120 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
L 
COME NOW the above-named Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, and 
submit this memorandum in support of their motion for reconsideration of the Commission's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order filed March 4, 2016. Through their Motion for 
Reconsideration, Defendants seek reversal of the award of attorney fees to Claimant as provided 
in the Commission's Order for the following reasons. 
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THE COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY FEES TO CLAIMANT SALINAS BECAUSE SHE FAILED TO PREVAIL 
AND BECAUSE NO PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION WAS JUSTLY DUE AND 
OWING THAT COULD FORM THE BASIS OF ANY SUCH AWARD. 
Defendants dispute the Commission's interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-804 as stated in 
Findings No. 65 and No. 74 on the grounds that (1) where an employee has not prevailed, she is 
not entitled to attorney fees and (2) where no compensation is "justly due and owing," there can 
be no award of attorney's fees. LC. § 72-804 provides in relevant part: 
If the commission or any court before whom any proceedings are 
brought under this law determines that the employer or his surety . 
. . without reasonable grounds discontinued payment of 
compensation as provided by law justly due and owing to the 
employee or his dependents, the employer shall pay reasonable 
attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by this 
law. 
( emphasis added). 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, statutory construction is 
inappropriate and effect must be given to the statute as written. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 
462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and 
rational meaning. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). If the 
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative 
history, or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 
2000). Statutory interpretation must give effect to legislative intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 
988 P.2d at 688. "In determining the ordinary meaning of a statute 'effect must be given to all 
the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant."' State 
v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 138 P.3d 308 (2006). Further, constructions of a statute that would 
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lead to an absurd result are disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525 
(2004); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004). 
Here, even though the legislature did not use the term "prevailing party," Defendants 
assert that the plain, obvious meaning of the relevant portion of the statute is that an employee 
must prevail in proving that she is owed a payment of compensation for an award of attorney 
fees. 1 This meaning is supported by the final portion of the statute that requires "reasonable 
attorney fees in addition to the compensation" owed. The meaning of "in addition to" is "as an 
extra person, thing, or circumstance." http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american 
_english/in-addition?q=in+addition (accessed March 24, 2016). Thus, for attorney fees to be 
"extra," there must first be compensation owed. Therefore, Defendants submit that, under the 
plain and obvious meaning of this provision, Claimant had to prevail in showing that she was 
due a payment of compensation before she could be awarded attorney fees. 
The Commission's statement in Finding No. 65 of the third way "in which a surety may 
incur attorney fees" must be rejected because the statement and its application in Finding No. 74 
constitute an inappropriate statutory construction of a clear and unambiguous statute. Finding 65 
provides that "a surety may incur attorney fees" when "a surety discontinue(s) compensation 
justly due and owing an employee without a reasonable ground." Because the Commission 
leaves out key phrases and words, Finding 65 constitutes an impermissible statutory 
interpretation. It is impermissible because, when construed as a whole, I.C. § 72-804 is clear and 
unambiguous. 
1 Absence of the phrase "prevailing party'' does not indicate legislative intent to permit the award to attorney fees to 
a non-prevailing party; rather, the word choice reflects the intent to limit attorney fee awards to employees only and 
to not include an awards to prevailing employers. 
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Even, however, if one were to assume that legislative ambiguity in the relevant provision 
required interpretation, the interpretation offered by the Commission fails because key language 
of the provision is rendered void or superfluous and, further, such a construction causes an 
absurd result. By eliminating the words "payment of' and "in addition to," the Commission 
changes the necessary components that must be proven for an award of attorney fees and renders 
these words meaningless. Importantly, as used by the legislature, the phrase ''justly due and 
owing" describes the word "payment" rather than the word "compensation." The requirements 
of proof as described in Finding No. 74 cannot be reconciled with the provision's plain, 
unambiguous language. More significantly, the Commission's construction leads to the absurd 
result that a non-prevailing party can be awarded attorney fees. In a search of Idaho case law, 
not a single case was located in which a non-prevailing party received attorney fees under I.C. § 
72-804. 
For the reasons above, the Commission's Findings Nos. 65 and 74 are in error as a matter 
of law because Claimant failed to prove an entitlement to attorney fees under the plain and 
unambiguous language of LC. § 72-804. Accordingly, Defendants respectfully request the 
Commission to strike Findings Nos. 65 and 74. 
ADDITIONALLY, THE COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR IN AW ARD ING 
ATTORNEY FEES IN THIS CASE BECAUSE RELEVANT FINDINGS WERE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Because the award of attorney fees arises from findings based on the testimony of a 
claimant lacking in credibility and supported only by speculation or otherwise incompetent 
evidence, the award should be reversed. 
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A claimant's entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804 "is a factual 
determination that rests with the Commission" that "will be upheld if it 1s based upon 
substantial, competent evidence." Davidson v. River/and Excavating, Inc., 147 Idaho 339, 346, 
209 P.3d 636 (2009). Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Shubert v. Macy's West, Inc., 158 Idaho 
92, 98, 343 P.3d 1099, 1105 (2015). "The Commission need not strictly adhere to the rules of 
evidence and has the discretion to consider any type of reliable evidence having probative 
value." Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 307, 179 P.3d 265 (2008) (emphasis 
added). Nonetheless, while "[m]uch latitude is permitted the board in the admission of evidence, 
... findings of fact cannot be based on incompetent evidence." Jensen v. Wheeler & England, 51 
Idaho 91, 95, 1 P.2d 624,626 (1931) (affirming order denying compensation because the hearsay 
testimony of a deceased worker's wife failed to constitute competent evidence). Furthermore, 
findings of fact must be based on the evidence and the inferences that "may legitimately be 
drawn" from it; inferences must be "sustained by the facts" and may not be based "on mere 
speculation and conjecture." Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 447-49, 599 P.2d 1012, 1018-20 
(1979). 
In Owen, an automobile driver's testimony that her tires did not cross a groove in the 
roadway at the time her vehicle struck the boy's bicycle did not permit the legitimate inference 
that the boy was not operating his bicycle as far to the right as practicable; rather, the purported 
inference was mere speculation and conjecture. 100 Idaho at 448-49, 599 P.2d at 1019-20. 
Because the driver's testimony did not shed light on where the boy was operating the bicycle, the 
facts could equally sustain the opposing inference that the boy had ridden as far to the right as 
possible. Id. Noting that the inference sought was not sustained by the facts in the record, the 
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Idaho Supreme Court held there was a lack of substantial evidence or legitimate inference to be 
drawn from the evidence in the record. Id. 
The finding that Claimant's medical treatment stopped because surety discontinued her 
medical benefits is based solely on the Claimant's unreliable testimony, and is not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. In assessing her credibility, the Referee stated that 
"Claimant seemed willing to say whatever sounded good and assisted her case ... with an 
almost casual indifference toward accuracy." Finding No. 35. The Commission found 
Claimant's credibility was diminished unless corroborated because Claimant's testimony was 
"blatantly inconsistent with the medical record," her own testimony was "dramatically different" 
on direct examination as opposed to what was "established on cross examination," she 
exaggerated testimony, and she demonstrated "poor memory for time frames and detail." Id. at 
34-35. It is against these substantiated and extensive factual findings that the Commission 
inconsistently found, without further explanation, that "Claimant testified convincingly" that 
Surety unreasonably discontinued her care. Finding No. 66. The findings in No. 35 are 
overwhelmingly difficult to reconcile with the finding in No. 66, and the incongruity begs the 
question of how a reasonable mind could accept Claimant's uncorroborated testimony in support 
of any conclusion. 
Only Claimant's overt self-serving statements support Claimant's position that she 
canceled appointments in July 2011 with Dr. Stagg and with physical therapy because the Surety 
"cut off' her care. See Finding No. 37. No evidence in the record supports any of Claimant's 
assertions regarding oral communications that benefits were discontinued, including the assertion 
that Dr. Stagg's office informed her that she had been cut off. Claimant herself rebutted this 
notion when she testified that she tried to go back a "couple weeks later" after her physical 
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therapy appointment on July 18, 2011, given her first no-show appointment with Dr. Stagg was 
July 20, 2011, and her canceled physical therapy appointment was July 21, 2011. Tr., 53:11-15; 
Ex. D, CLA000164; Ex. E, CLA000225. As acknowledged in Finding No. 38, Defendants 
rebutted with the contemporaneous medical record that Claimant herself canceled and/or no-
showed her appointments. 
While Defendants agree that the medical record is not dispositive of the reason that 
Claimant no-showed her scheduled July appointments, under Owens, the Commission must 
reject the speculation that Claimant would have "little reason" to no-show her appointments 
except that she could not afford to pay. Just as an inference that the boy had been riding his bike 
too close to traffic could not be legitimately drawn from the driver's testimony in Owens that she 
did not cross a groove in the road; the inference that Claimant would have not missed her 
scheduled appointment except for her inability to pay because Surety had denied her benefits 
cannot be legitimately drawn from Claimant's testimony. The facts equally sustain other 
alternative inferences: such as, an inference could be drawn that Claimant no-showed because 
she felt that her treatment was ridiculous (see Finding No. 40); or an inference could be drawn 
from the contemporaneous medical record that Claimant no-showed because she felt better after 
a mild injury. Accordingly, the finding that Claimant would have "little reason" to no-show but 
for the inability to pay is mere speculation and conjecture not properly supported by evidence or 
an inference that can be legitimately drawn from it. 
Further, Findings No. 37 and 68 that Claimant could not afford to arrange payment for 
medical care during the relevant period of July through November 2011 are not substantiated by 
the record. At hearing, Claimant established that she was employed continuously through the 
relevant period as she worked for Defendant Employer until she started work for Idaho Home 
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Health in August. Tr., 44:13-16, 49:24-50:3. Claimant worked for Idaho Home Health for three 
months when she was fired due a dispute over that employer's practices. Id.; Tr., 83:9-11. 
Claimant confirmed that she was not unemployed until after November 2011. Tr., 56:19-21. 
That Claimant testified that she couldn't afford treatment because she was unemployed 
contradicts her own testimony. Tr. 56: 21-25. Thus, Claimant's evidence is not competent and 
the record fails to support the finding that Claimant could not afford treatment due to 
unemployment because the weight of the evidence proves that Claimant reached MMI before she 
was unemployed. See Conclusion of Law No. 2. For the reasons stated above, Defendants 
respectfully request the Commission to strike Findings No. 37 and 68. 
Next, the finding of fact that Claimant was notified in writing that her benefits were 
denied cannot be based on the incompetent evidence of Dr. Sirucek's statement that he had seen 
a letter. (See Finding No. 44). In his opinion letter, Dr. Sirucek cited to a letter allegedly dated 
in August 2011 purporting to confirm the Surety's denial of Claimant's benefits. (See Finding 
36). Defendants objected to the admission of Dr. Sirucek's opinion letter both through pre-
hearing motion and at hearing. As the Court underscored in Jensen v. Wheeler & England, the 
Commission may not base a factual finding on incompetent hearsay testimony. Because Dr. 
Sirucek's statement regarding the letter is mere hearsay for which there is no exception, 
reference to his statement cannot form the basis of a finding of fact. The lack of competence of 
Dr. Sirucek's is highlighted by Finding No. 51 that noted Dr. Sirucek's bias and overall lack of 
impartiality. 
Finally, Findings Nos. 72 and 73 should be stricken because both are mere speculation 
and conjecture regarding the cause of the litigation. The inferences were not legitimately drawn 
from the evidence presented because the facts sustain the opposing inference. Given that 
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Claimant has a degenerative condition, has a long history of low back pain that pre-dates the 
subject work injury, and had an exacerbation of her condition just months before the subject 
injury that was documented as severe, the facts equally sustain that Claimant would have sought 
litigation for continued palliative care at Defendants expense regardless of what, if anything, 
Defendants did or did not do in 2011. There is no competent evidence that supports Claimant 
would have filed litigation but for the questionable evidence regarding treatment being denied in 
the fall of 2011. 
For the reasons that the award of attorney fees arose from findings based on the 
testimony of a claimant lacking in credibility and supported by a hearsay statement by a biased 
witness as explained above, Defendants respectfully request that Finding Nos. 37, 41, 42, 44, 68, 
72 and 73 be stricken and the attorney fee award be reversed. 
EVEN IF THE COMMISSION DETERMINES THAT ITS FINDINGS WERE 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT, CLAIMANT DID NOT MEET 
HER BURDEN BY A PREPONDERANCE AND THE BURDEN WAS IMPERMISSIBLY 
SHIFTED TO DEFENDANTS TO PROVE THAT THEY ACTED REASONABLY. 
A "claimant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, all the facts 
essential to recovery." Waters v. All Phase Constr., 156 Idaho 259, 262 (2014) (emphasis 
added). A preponderance of the evidence requires more than relevant evidence a reasonable 
mind might accept to support a conclusion. Evans v. Hara 's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473,478 (1993). 
Defendants submit that the testimony of an impeached witness supported by the 
statement of a biased expert lacking impartiality, in the absence of any reliable evidence, was 
insufficient to meet Claimant's burden in proving that Defendant acted unreasonably. The 
weight of the medical record demonstrates that Defendants provided the full gamut of medical 
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care including an MRI. See Finding No. 67. Within a short period, Claimant reached MMI with 
no impairment or residuals. See Conclusion of Law No. 2. Claimant must first meet her burden 
before Defendants must carry the burden of rebuttal. 
Because the Claimant did not carry her burden to prove by a preponderance that 
Defendants acted unreasonably in denying benefits, Defendants respectfully request that the 
Commission reverse the award of attorney fees. 
ADDITIONALLY, THE COMMISSION PREJUDICED DEFENDANTS BY DEPRIVING 
THEM OF THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A BIFURCATED HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF 
ATTORNEY FEES AS MOTIONED WITHOUT CLAIMANT OBJECTION. 
The Defendants were prejudiced in presenting their case by the denial of a bifurcated 
hearing on the issue of attorney fees. Defendants submitted an unopposed motion for bifurcation 
that was unopposed by Claimant. Because the motion was denied, Defendants were denied the 
opportunity to present relevant evidence in their defense. Objection to hearing on the issue of 
attorney fees without bifurcation was raised again at hearing. 
The concern over now known issues of denial that might have been raised initially 
prompted Defendants' motion to bifurcate regarding attorney fees. 
THE COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR BECAUSE SECTION 72-804 IS NOT A 
PENALTY STATUTE 
"[The Idaho Supreme] Court has held that an award of attorney fees in a workers' 
compensation case must be deemed compensation to the injured employee and not as a penalty 
against the employer or surety." Dennis v. School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 P.3d 329 
(2000). That reinforces the argument made at the outset of this Memorandum that Idaho Code § 
72-804 requires a showing that there is a "payment of compensation" which is ''justly due and 
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owing." The Commission did not award Claimant further medical benefits. Consequently, the 
most Claimant theoretically was out during the period prior to being declared MMI was a lost 
opportunity to obtain additional medical care "at the expense of the employer" under Idaho Code 
§72-432(1). Why she did not seek such care, as explained previously, cannot be answered 
except by resorting to speculation and conjecture. Thus, a "lost opportunity", without more, 
cannot be the basis for an award of attorney fees. 
As noted, there is no penalty in §72-804. Moreover, even those statutes found at §72-602 
and §72-604, which provide for penalties, do not allow for attorney fees. Such administrative 
penalties provide the only penalties pertaining to claims. No authority exists for attorney fees as 
an administrative penalty, even if conduct justifies. Thus, a penalty of any kind is not 
appropriate or supported as no benefits were awarded. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
The foregoing Commission erred in awarding attorney fees to Claimant and Defendants 
respectfully request a reversal of that determination. 
DATED this~ day of March, 2016. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION -P. 11 
43 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1,. '{\A-'" day of March, 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Patrick D. Brown 
516 Hansen Street East 
P.O. Box 125 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
Legal Assistant 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LETICIA M. SALINAS, 
Claimant, 
v. 
BRIDGE VIEW ESTATES, 
Employer, 
and 
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMP ANY, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC 2011-014120 
ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Fl E 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, Defendants timely filed a motion for reconsideration of 
the Commission's March 4, 2016 decision in the above-captioned case. Defendants argue, first, 
that the Commission erred in awarding Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees; second, that the 
decision lacked substantial and competent evidence to support the findings relating to attorney 
fees; third, that the decision impermissibly penalized Defendants; fourth, that the decision 
unfairly shifted the burden of showing reasonableness to Defendants; and fifth, that the decision 
prejudiced Defendants by depriving them of a bifurcated hearing on attorney fees. Claimant did 
not file a response. 
DISCUSSION 
Under Idaho Code§ 72-718, a decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall 
be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated; provided, that within twenty (20) days 
from the date of filing the decision any party may move for reconsideration or rehearing of the 
decision. The Commission is not compelled to make findings on the facts of the case during a 
reconsideration. Davison v. H.H. Keim Co., Ltd., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196. The 
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Commission may reverse its decision upon a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing of the 
decision in question, based on the arguments presented, or upon its own motion, provided that it 
acts within the time frame established in Idaho Code § 72-718. See, Dennis v. School District 
No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 P.3d 329 (2000) (citing Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 
Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 410 (1988)). 
Claimant alleged she injured her back while lifting a patient on or about May 5, 2011. 
While she was receiving medical treatment, Claimant asserted that Surety "temporarily denied" 
her claim and refused to communicate with her. Defendants countered that Claimant 
canceled/no-showed to her appointments, and that such appointments were unnecessary. 
Around May 2015, Defendants' expert, Dr. Michael Hajjar opined that Claimant's industrial 
injury was a lumbar strain/sprain, and had resolved within six (6) months of the injury. While 
ultimately accepting Dr. Hajjar's medical opinion, the Referee was critical of Defendants' 
handling of the claim, including (1) denying Claimant's medical care before a physician 
declared Claimant at MMI; (2) unreasonably delaying its decision on continuing coverage on an 
accepted claim; and (3) refusing to communicate with Claimant on her coverage status despite 
her repeated attempts to speak with the adjuster. The Commission adopted the Referee's 
proposed findings in its March 4, 2016 Order including (1) Claimant has failed to prove her 
current low back condition was caused in whole or in part by the industrial accident of May 5, 
2011; (2) Claimant has failed to prove her right to reimbursement for medical care for her low 
back after she reached MMI in November 2011; (3) Claimant has failed to prove she is entitled 
to permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefits from her industrial injury; (4) Claimant has 
failed to prove she is entitled to permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits from her industrial 
accident; and ( 5) Claimant has proven she is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho 
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Code § 72-804 for Surety's prolonged denial of medical benefits without a reasonable ground. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-718, the Commission's decision was final and conclusive as to all 
matters adjudicated. For the reasons set forth in more detail below, the Commission declines to 
reconsider its March 4, 2016 Order. 
Idaho Code 72-804 Attorney Fees 
First, Defendants argue that the Commission erred in awarding Idaho Code § 72-804 
attorney fees. Defendants contend that the plain and obvious meaning of Idaho Code § 72-804 is 
that Claimant must have compensation "justly due and owing" to obtain an award of attorney's 
fees. Defendants argue that Claimant cannot meet this statutory requirement because she did not 
receive additional workers' compensation benefits, and ask the Commission to strike findings 
No. 65 and 74. 
Idaho Code§ 72-804 states: 
72-804. ATTORNEY'S FEES -- PUNITIVE COSTS IN CERTAIN CASES. If 
the commission or any court before whom any proceedings are brought under this 
law determines that the employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation 
made by an injured employee or dependent of a deceased employee without 
reasonable ground, or that an employer or his surety neglected or refused within a 
reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to pay to the 
injured employee or his dependents the compensation provided by law, or without 
reasonable grounds discontinued payment of compensation as provided by law 
justly due and owing to the employee or his dependents, the employer shall pay 
reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by this law. In 
all such cases the fees of attorneys employed by injured employees or their 
dependents shall be fixed by the commission. 
The statute is written in the disjunctive, providing three routes to establish entitlement to 
attorney's fees: (1) unreasonably contesting a claim for benefits; (2) failing to pay benefits within 
a reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation; and (3) discontinuing 
compensation justly due and owing an employee without a reasonable ground. After reviewing 
all three grounds, the Referee reasoned that Surety's actions fell under the third-discontinuing 
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compensation justly due and owing to Claimant without a reasonable ground, not per se by 
temporarily suspending her medical coverage, but by unreasonably delaying its decision on 
continuing coverage on an accepted claim and/or refusing to communicate with Claimant on her 
coverage status despite her repeated attempts to speak with the adjuster. Although the Referee 
found that Claimant was not entitled to further medical care and reached MMI at hearing, the 
Referee reasoned that Surety acted unreasonably in discontinuing her medical treatment and 
failing to communicate at the time in question. 
Defendants' insistence that Claimant cannot be awarded Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney 
fees, because nothing is now "due and owing" is misplaced. Defendants are reminded that 
Claimant was actively treating for her industrial injury, which was an accepted claim, when 
Surety declined payment for additional treatment without a contemporaneous medical predicate, 
and gave Claimant the runaround about her claim status. No physician had declared Claimant to 
be at MMI at the time. Under the facts of this case, Surety's decision to discontinue payment of 
Claimant's treatment before Claimant had been declared MMI, and without appropriately 
communicating and/or investigating the matter denied Claimant benefits justly due during the 
pendency of her workers' compensation claim. Even though Defendants obtained a persuasive 
medical opinion that declared Claimant stable, this was procured years after Defendants' 
unsubstantiated denial. Defendants cannot excuse their actions by Claimant's subsequent 
recovery. To hold otherwise would cause an unjust result. While Defendants disagree with the 
Referee's findings, Idaho Code § 72-804 was not applied in error. 
Substantial and Competent Evidence Supporting the Idaho Code§ 72-804 Award 
Defendants argue that the Order lacks substantial and competent evidence to support the 
award of Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees. First, Defendants are critical of any reliance on 
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Claimant's testimony, given the finding that Claimant's contested testimony was diminished 
unless corroborated. Second, Defendants urge the Commission to reject the "speculation that 
Claimant would have 'little reason' to no-show her appointments except that she could not afford 
to pay." Third, Defendants argue that the Referee relied on incompetent hearsay testimony, i.e., 
Dr. Sirucek' s opinion letter cited to a letter allegedly dated in August 2011 purporting to confirm 
the Surety's denial of Claimant's benefits. Finally, Defendants ask the Commission to strike the 
"speculation and conjecture regarding the cause of the litigation" in findings Nos. 72 and 73. 
First, the Commission appreciates that Defendants raised a different narrative as to what 
caused Claimant to miss appointments, and whether the case was reasonably handled and or 
denied, but those issues were resolved in the decision below. The Referee was completely 
transparent with his assessment of Claimant's credibility, identifying exaggerations and 
inconsistencies in her testimony, and that she appeared somewhat self-serving. However, as 
detailed in the Decision, the Referee did not think Claimant was scheming to deceive, or that she 
had such a comfort level with communicating untrue statements that the entirety of her testimony 
should be discarded. The Commission has never required witnesses and experts to be infallible 
in order to be believed, and finds that the Referee's careful treatment of Claimant's credibility 
shows he was not improperly reliant on her testimony. 
Second, the parties disputed what caused Claimant to miss appointments and the Surety's 
handling of the claim. Defendants insist that Claimant's explanation cannot be believed, and that 
she could have paid for medical care if she needed it because she was continuously employed 
during the relevant period. The Commission disagrees. Not only are Defendants attempting to 
re-litigate the facts, but financial pressures are a reasonable, common sense explanation of 
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Claimant's actions. Being regularly employed does not necessarily equate with having the 
financial means to assume responsibility for medical care. 
Third, Defendants argue that the Referee improperly relied on hearsay evidence, 
specifically Dr. Sirucek's opinion letter. The Referee did not exclusively rely on Dr. Sirucek's 
opinion letter which allegedly confirmed Surety's denial of Claimant's benefits to determine that 
Surety suspended Claimant's medical benefits. The Referee acknowledged the controversy 
between the parties, considered the conflicting narratives, and found Claimant's version of 
events persuasive based on the evidence in its entirety. The Commission is not persuaded that 
the Referee gave Dr. Sirucek's letter improper weight, and rejects Defendants' arguments. 
Finally, the Commission disagrees with Defendants' objection to the "speculation and 
conjecture regarding the cause of the litigation" in findings Nos. 72 and 73. While litigation 
cannot always be avoided, the Referee could not overlook the obvious consequences of Surety's 
unreasonable behavior, and took great care to outline why Surety's actions were unacceptable 
and undoubtedly led to the uncertainty which helped fuel this litigation. The Commission will 
not revisit this finding on reconsideration. 
Idaho Code § 72-804 is not a Penalty 
Defendants assert that the Commission impermissibly penalized them by awarding 
attorney fees where Claimant did not secure further medical benefits. The Commission agrees 
that Idaho Code§ 72-804 is not a penalty; the award is said to be compensatory, the underlying 
rationale being that the claimant should not have workers' compensation benefits lessened by 
legal expenses incurred as a result of the employer's and surety's unwarranted conduct in 
refusing or delaying compensation of an otherwise compensable claim. Clark v. Sage, 102 
Idaho 261, (1981). Idaho Code § 72-804 applies only where unreasonable conduct appears. 
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The decision that grounds exist for awarding a claimant attorney fees is a factual determination 
which rests with the Commission. Troutner v. Traffic Control Company, 97 Idaho 525, 528, 547 
P.2d 1130, 1133 (1976). The Order extensively addresses why the Surety's actions were an 
unreasonable denial of compensation justly due to the Claimant. Surety simply cannot excuse 
their unreasonableness with Claimant's subsequent recovery. The Commission declines to 
revisit these factual findings and rejects the argument that Defendants were penalized. 
The Burden of Proving Unreasonableness 
Defendants argue that the evidence Claimant presented was insufficient to prove that 
Defendants acted unreasonably. Defendants contend that they provided Claimant the "full gamut 
of medical care," and that the attorney fee award should be reversed. This is but a variation of 
the factual arguments Defendants presented below and on reconsideration. Defendants continue 
in their perception that Claimant's case was so weak that she could not possibly have prevailed 
against them. Not so. While Claimant's case was not without weaknesses, the Referee found 
Claimant's version of events surrounding how and why her medical care abruptly ended 
persuasive, and how (poorly) Surety handled its obligation to Claimant. The Commission 
declines to revisit these findings. 
Defendants' Request for a Bifurcation 
Defendants insist that their request for bifurcation of issues motion was unopposed, and 
should have been granted to bifurcate Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees from the other issues. 
Commission Referees are empowered and authorized to conduct hearings with a view toward 
promoting judicial economy and efficient case resolution. Parties are not entitled to a bifurcation 
simply because they request it. The Referee thoughtfully addressed Defendants' arguments for 
bifurcation in his March 17, 2015 Order Denying Motion to Bifurcate. The Referee reasoned 
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that Defendants did not present a cogent reason to bifurcate the attorney fee issue. The Referee 
also reasoned that finality is important, and there was no reason presented to drag this matter out 
longer than necessary, or require a separate hearing on whether Defendants' conduct subjects 
them to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804. The Commission finds that 
Defendants were not prejudiced by the Referee's denial of the request to bifurcate. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' request for reconsideration is DENIED. 
DATED this d"vthday of Gf.RJ..J , 2016. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
L/Jbz ---d 
RD. Maynard, Cha~ 
ATTEST: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ,l fjt/1 day of 9it-D/. J , 2016, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order Denying Defendants' otion for Reconsideration was served by 
regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
ALAN GARDNER 
POBOX2528 
BOISE ID 83701 
PATRICK BROWN 
PO BOX 125 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
ka 
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Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LET1C1A M. SALINAS, ) 
) 
Claimant - Respondent, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
BRJDGE VIEW ESTATES, ) 
) 
Employer, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, ) 
) 
Surety, ) 
___________ Qgfendants - Appellants. ) 
IC# 2011-014120 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, LETICL.\ M. SALINAS AND HER 
ATTORNEY, 
PATRICK BROvVN 
P.O. BOX 125 
TWIN FALLS, IDAHO 83303 
AND THE CLERK OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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1. The above-named Appellants, Defendant Employer Bridge View Estates and 
Defendant Surety Old Republic Insurance Company, appeal against the above-named Respondent to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order entered by the Idaho Industrial Commission in the above 
entitled action on the 4th day of March, 2016, Chairman R.D. Maynard presiding, and from the 
Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, filed April 28, 2016, Chainnan R.D. 
Maynard presiding. Copies of the judgments or orders being appealed are attached to this notice. 
2. That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments 
or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appeal able orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 ( d)( 1 ), 
I.AR. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal is: 
a) Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-804, did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as 
a matter of law in awarding attorney fees for "prolonged denial of medical 
benefits" where the claimant was awarded no compensation other than 
attorney fees? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any part of the record or transcript. 
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
(b) The Appellants request the preparation of the entire standard reporter's transcript 
both in hard copy and electronic format to include the August 6, 2015, hearing. 
6. As encouraged by Rule 28, I.A.R. and because this appeal is limited strictly to a 
question of!aw, Appellants request a clerk's (agency's) record more limited than the standard record. 
The agency record should include only the following standard content: 
(a) Order filed March 4, 2016, 
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(b) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation filed March 4, 2016, 
and 
(c) Reporter's transcript of the August 6, 2015, hearing as requested above. 
In addition to the standard content as specified above, the Appellants request the 
following documents also be included in the clerk's (agency's) record: 
(a) Defendants' Post Hearing Brief filed December 30, 2015, 
(b) Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration filed March 24, 2016, and 
(c) Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. 
7. The appellate requests the following offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and 
sent to the Supreme Court. 
(a) None. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been 
paid. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
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DATED this !l!::.. day of May, 2016. 
e . everdon - of the firm 
GARDNER LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for the Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of May, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Patrick Brown 
P.O. Box 125 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, the 
last known address as set forth above. 
S6-, ... ~ 
Legal Assistant 
GARDNER LAW OFFICE 
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HEFORE THE SUPREM.E COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LETICIA M .. SALINAS, 
Claimant1Respondent, SUPREM.E COURT NO. Lf 4-l 'a~ 
v. 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
BRIDGE VIEW ESTA TES, Employer, and 
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Surety, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Appeal From: Industrial Commission, 
R.D. Maynard, Chairman presiding 
Case Number: IC 2011-014120 
Order Appealed from: Findings of Pact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation, and Order, filed March 4, 2016; 
Order Denying Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration, filed April 28, 2016. 
Attorney for Appellants: 
Attorney for ReSpondent: 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: 
Alan R. Gardner 
PO Box 2528 
Boise ID 83701 
Patrick D. Brown 
PO Box 125 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Defendants/ Appellants 
Bridge View Estates, Employer and 
Old Republic Insurance Company, Surety 
Claimant/Respondent 
Leticia M. Salinas 
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Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Nan1e of Reporter: 
Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
May 9, 2016 
$94.00 to Supreme Court and 
$100.00 to Industrial Commission 
Checks were received. 
M.D. Willis 
Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript 
has been prepared and filed with the Commission. 
May IO, 2016 
Assistant C01m11ission Secretary 
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I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing are true and correct 
photocopies of the Notice of Appeal; Findings of Fact, Conc.lusions of Law, and 
Recommendation; Order; and Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, and 
the whole thereof, in IC case number 2011-014120 for Leticia M. Salinas v. Bridge Vievv 
Estates and Old Republic Insurance Company. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of 
said Commission this 10th day of May, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
I, Jennifer S. Komperud, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary 
of the Industrial Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true 
and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included 
in the Agency's Record Supreme Court Docket No. 44186 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b). 
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly 
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon settlement 
of the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record herein. ,,,,unm,,,,,, 
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LETICIA SALINAS, ) 
) 
Claimant/Respondent, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
BRIDGVIEW EST ATES, Employer, and ) 
OLD REPUBLIC INS. CO., Surety, ) 
) 
Defendants/ Appellants. ) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 44186 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; and 
Alan Gardner for the Appellants; and 
Patrick Brown for the Respondent. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and, 
pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a) Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been served 
by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
Appellants' Attorney: 
Respondent's Attorney: 
ALAN GARDNER 
PO BOX 2528 
BOISE ID 83701 
PATRICK BROWN 
PO BOX 125 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a) Idaho Appellate Rules, 
all parties have twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to 
the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. 
In the event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the twenty-
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Jennifer S. Kofffp-emtl'' 
Assistant Commission Secretary 
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